CAS Case Digest · Verified against the full award text

CAS 2025/A/12028 — Rodrigó Szuhai Jr & Gyula Szuhai Jr v. Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI)

"Szuhai v. FEI" · CAS lifted FEI provisional safeguarding suspensions as disproportionate after eight-plus months without charges being filed.

What happened in Szuhai v. FEI

Two Hungarian youth jumping athletes, brothers Rodrigó Szuhai Jr (born 13 December 2009) and Gyula Szuhai Jr (born 4 July 2007), were provisionally suspended by the FEI on 6 August 2025 following a physical altercation at a karaoke party during the CSI Samorin competition in Slovakia on 26 July 2025. The victim, athlete A., was hospitalised for four days, received stitches, and a CT scan revealed minor brain bleeding. The FEI relied on Article 7 of its Safeguarding Policy Against Harassment and Abuse. The Athletes applied to the FEI Tribunal to lift the suspensions; on 24 November 2025 the FEI Tribunal rejected that application, applying the Article R37 CAS Code criteria and placing the burden on the Athletes. The Athletes appealed to CAS. The Sole Arbitrator held that Article R37 criteria were inapplicable because the Athletes sought a permanent ruling on legality, not interim relief. He placed the burden on the FEI and applied a proportionality analysis under Swiss law. He found the suspension of the Second Appellant entirely unjustified for lack of any particularised allegation of misconduct. As to the First Appellant, while a plausible safeguarding risk existed, the suspension was disproportionate stricto sensu after more than eight months with no charges filed and no clear timeline for resolution. Both suspensions were lifted with immediate effect. The case matters because it establishes that provisional safeguarding suspensions under the FEI Policy must satisfy proportionality requirements and cannot be maintained indefinitely pending an open-ended investigation.

Procedural history of CAS 2025/A/12028

On 6 August 2025 the FEI imposed provisional suspensions on both Athletes under Article 7 of the FEI Safeguarding Policy Against Harassment and Abuse, barring them from participating in or attending any FEI or National Federation competition or event in any capacity. On 18 August 2025 the Athletes applied to the FEI Tribunal to lift the suspensions. After multiple written exchanges and two hearings, the FEI Tribunal on 24 November 2025 rejected the application, applying the Article R37 CAS Code criteria cumulatively and finding the Athletes had not established irreparable harm, thereby rendering likelihood of success irrelevant. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. The Athletes filed a Statement of Appeal at CAS on 14 December 2025, updated on 15 December 2025, within the 21-day deadline under Article 162.7 of the FEI General Regulations. The Appellants requested a sole arbitrator; the FEI objected but the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division appointed Dr Heiner Kahlert as Sole Arbitrator. Both parties elected to proceed on written submissions only.

Key holdings in CAS 2025/A/12028

• Article R37 CAS Code criteria do not apply when an appellant seeks a permanent ruling on the legality of a provisional suspension rather than interim protection pending a final merits decision.
• The burden of proving that a provisional suspension is lawful rests on the federation that imposed it, not on the suspended athlete, absent a rule expressly reversing that burden.
• Even where Article 7 of the FEI Safeguarding Policy is silent on substantive requirements, any provisional suspension must satisfy the three-pronged proportionality test under Swiss law: suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu.
• The FEI failed to establish any plausible safeguarding risk emanating from the Second Appellant, as no particularised allegation of misconduct was made against him, rendering his provisional suspension unsuitable and therefore unlawful.
• A provisional suspension becomes disproportionate stricto sensu when maintained for more than eight months without charges being filed and with no discernible timeline for resolution, particularly where the evidence against the suspended athlete is not straightforward.

How the CAS panel reasoned

The Sole Arbitrator first rejected the FEI Tribunal's application of Article R37 CAS Code, explaining that those criteria govern requests for interim relief pending a final decision, not appeals seeking a definitive ruling on legality; applying them would produce absurd results, including dismissing an appeal regardless of whether any safeguarding risk existed. He then placed the burden of proof on the FEI and applied the standard of comfortable satisfaction drawn by analogy from Article 30.2 of the FEI Tribunal Regulations. On suitability, he accepted that for provisional measures the FEI need only establish a plausible risk rather than prove an actual Policy violation, and found such risk established for the First Appellant given undisputed evidence of a push causing hospitalisation, but entirely absent for the Second Appellant. On necessity, he expressed doubt but declined to decide the point. On proportionality stricto sensu, he weighed five factors: the severity of the measure (total competition ban) against the non-straightforward evidence; the specific social context of the incident making recurrence at competitions less likely; the deterrent effect of eight months of suspension and ongoing investigations on young athletes aged 15 and 18; the availability of less restrictive alternatives; and the open-ended duration with no charge filed and no timeline indicated. He concluded the suspensions were evidently and grossly disproportionate and lifted both with immediate effect, expressly reserving the FEI's right to bring charges or impose new measures on changed circumstances.

Why Szuhai v. FEI matters in CAS jurisprudence

This award establishes that CAS reviews provisional safeguarding suspensions on the merits of proportionality under Swiss law, not under the Article R37 interim-relief criteria, and that the burden lies on the federation. It clarifies that Article 7 of the FEI Safeguarding Policy, though silent on substantive requirements, does not confer unfettered discretion, and that an open-ended provisional suspension maintained for over eight months without charges becomes evidently and grossly disproportionate, setting a temporal accountability standard for FEI safeguarding investigations.

Cases cited in this award

CAS 2017/A/4968 CAS 2021/A/8417 CAS 2008/A/1480 CAS 2020/A/6807 CAS 2019/A/6330 CAS 2020/O/6698

Frequently asked questions about Szuhai v. FEI

Why did CAS lift the Szuhai brothers' FEI provisional suspensions if the First Appellant admitted pushing the victim?

The Sole Arbitrator found that while a plausible safeguarding risk existed for the First Appellant based on undisputed evidence of a push causing hospitalisation, the provisional suspension had lasted more than eight months with no charges filed and no clear timeline for resolution. Applying the proportionality test under Swiss law, he concluded this duration was evidently and grossly disproportionate, particularly given the non-straightforward evidence, the specific social context of the incident, and the deterrent effect already achieved on two young athletes aged 15 and 18. The award expressly preserves the FEI's right to bring charges or impose new measures.

Does the Szuhai v. FEI case mean Article R37 CAS Code criteria never apply to appeals against provisional suspensions?

No. The Sole Arbitrator distinguished between an appellant seeking interim protection from the effects of a decision pending a final ruling (where Article R37 applies) and an appellant seeking a definitive ruling on the legality of the provisional suspension itself (where Article R37 does not apply). Because the Szuhai brothers sought only to permanently set aside the suspensions, Article R37 was inapplicable. Had they sought a stay of the suspensions pending a later merits hearing, Article R37 would have governed.

Why was Gyula Szuhai Jr's (the Second Appellant's) provisional suspension lifted even though he was present at the incident?

The FEI made no particularised allegation of misconduct against the Second Appellant; the initial notification letter used identical generic language for both brothers. Victim A. filed a criminal complaint only against the First Appellant, and A.'s own statement clarified there was 'no direct physical attack' during the indoor altercation. No witness reported conduct by the Second Appellant that could amount to a violation of Articles 2.2, 2.6 or 2.7 of the FEI Safeguarding Policy. The Sole Arbitrator therefore found the FEI had failed to establish any plausible safeguarding risk emanating from the Second Appellant, making his suspension unsuitable and unlawful.

What standard of proof must the FEI meet to justify a provisional safeguarding suspension under the Szuhai ruling?

The Sole Arbitrator applied the standard of comfortable satisfaction drawn by analogy from Article 30.2 of the FEI Tribunal Regulations, but calibrated the substantive threshold to the provisional nature of the measure. At the suitability stage, the FEI need only establish to the Sole Arbitrator's comfortable satisfaction that there is a plausible risk to the welfare of the equestrian community emanating from the athlete — it need not prove an actual Policy violation. However, the more severe the measure, the higher the corresponding risk must be, and the FEI must also satisfy necessity and proportionality stricto sensu, with the burden throughout resting on the FEI.

Topics: Transfers, agents, TPO & sell-on clauses at CAS

Source: official award. This digest was generated by LexXi from the full award text and machine-verified against it — every figure, article and citation above appears in the source. It is an editorial summary, not legal advice. See how ElevenLex verification works.