CAS Case Digest · Verified against the full award text
CAS 2004/A/701 — Sport Club Internacional v. Galatasaray Spor Kulübü Dernegi
"Internacional v. Galatasaray" · CAS upheld co-ownership agreements over player economic rights as FIFA-compatible and awarded USD 500,000 in damages.
| Award date | 17 March 2005 |
| Panel | President: Professor Massimo Coccia; Arbitrators: Mr Michele Bernasconi, Ms Margarita Echeverria Bermudez |
| Outcome | Appeal upheld in part; Galatasaray ordered to pay Internacional USD 400,000 (in addition to the USD 100,000 already paid), for a total compensation of USD 500,000; all other claims dismissed; arbitration costs shared equally; each party bears its own legal costs. |
| Provisions | Art. 1.1 of the FIFA Regulations governing the Application of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players Art. 10 of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 1 September 2001) Art. 13 et seq. of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players Art. 21 et seq. of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (contractual stability) Art. R58 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration Art. 59.2 of the FIFA Statutes Arts. 59-61 of the FIFA Statutes Art. R47 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration Art. R44.2 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration Art. R64.4 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration |
What happened in Internacional v. Galatasaray
Brazilian club Internacional and Turkish club Galatasaray entered a Co-ownership Agreement on 2 July 2002 over 50% of the economic rights to player Fabio Pinto, who had signed a five-year employment contract with Galatasaray. The agreement required Galatasaray to pay Internacional USD 100,000 per year if it did not exercise its purchase option. In October 2003, the player terminated his employment contract and Galatasaray signed a Termination Agreement with him, paying USD 600,000, without Internacional's consent. Internacional filed a FIFA complaint seeking USD 3,500,000. The FIFA Single Judge awarded only USD 100,000. Internacional appealed to CAS. The panel first confirmed that co-ownership agreements splitting economic rights between clubs are compatible with FIFA regulations, distinguishing player registration from economic rights. It then found Galatasaray in breach of the Co-ownership Agreement by consenting to the player's release without Internacional's knowledge or consent, and by failing to invoke FIFA contractual stability rules. However, as the agreement imposed no obligation to buy or sell the rights, damages were limited to the lost annual fees of USD 100,000 for five years, totalling USD 500,000. Since USD 100,000 had already been paid, Galatasaray was ordered to pay an additional USD 400,000. The case is significant for validating the legal framework of co-ownership of player economic rights in international football.
Procedural history of CAS 2004/A/701
On 7 November 2003, Internacional filed a complaint before the FIFA Players' Status Committee claiming breach of the Co-ownership Agreement and seeking USD 3,500,000 from Galatasaray. On 20 August 2004, the Single Judge of the FIFA Players' Status Committee issued a decision partially accepting Internacional's claim, awarding only USD 100,000 on the basis that compensation for 15 months of the player's services was reasonable, and rejecting all further claims. Galatasaray paid the USD 100,000 on 16 September 2004, which Internacional acknowledged. On 30 August 2004, Internacional lodged an appeal with CAS against the Single Judge's decision, filing its appeal brief on 8 September 2004. Galatasaray filed its answer on 4 October 2004. Additional submissions were exchanged in late December 2004 and early January 2005. A hearing was held on 11 January 2005 in Rome. CAS was asked to reverse the FIFA decision and award USD 3,500,000 plus the USD 100,000 already decided.
Key holdings in CAS 2004/A/701
- Co-ownership agreements splitting economic rights over a player between two clubs are compatible with FIFA regulations, provided the player is under an employment contract with one club and expressly consents to the arrangement.
- A player's registration and the economic rights to a player's performances are legally distinct concepts: registration cannot be shared between clubs simultaneously, but economic rights may be partially assigned and apportioned among different right holders.
- Galatasaray breached the Co-ownership Agreement by consenting to the termination of the player's employment contract and allowing the player to become a free agent without Internacional's consent, regardless of whether the initial termination notice was unilateral.
- Damages for breach of a co-ownership agreement are limited to losses that are certain and proven; in the absence of evidence of any sale of economic rights, compensation is confined to the contractually agreed annual loan fees lost over the remaining contract period.
- Where a respondent consents to early termination of an employment contract without invoking FIFA contractual stability rules, it cannot subsequently argue that its obligations under a related co-ownership agreement also terminated as a consequence.
How the CAS panel reasoned
The panel first examined ex officio whether the Co-ownership Agreement was enforceable under FIFA regulations, concluding that Art. 1.1 of the Application Regulations governs only player registration and does not prohibit clubs from apportioning economic rights, provided the player consents. It drew support from CAS 2004/A/635 (Espanyol v. Velez) and Art. 10 of the Status and Transfer Regulations, which itself distinguishes registration from economic conditions of a loan. On the merits, the panel rejected Galatasaray's argument that the player's unilateral termination letter absolved it of liability, finding that by signing the Termination Agreement and paying the player USD 600,000 without contesting the departure or invoking FIFA contractual stability rules (Art. 21 et seq. of the Status and Transfer Regulations), Galatasaray effectively consented to the termination and rendered it bilateral. The panel characterised the Co-ownership Agreement as a joint venture imposing mutual duties of transparency and cooperation, meaning neither club could release the player without the other's consent. On quantum, the panel rejected Internacional's claim for USD 3,500,000 because no evidence of third-party purchase offers was presented and the agreement imposed no obligation to buy or sell. Damages were therefore limited to the certain loss: five annual fees of USD 100,000, totalling USD 500,000, minus the USD 100,000 already paid.
Why Internacional v. Galatasaray matters in CAS jurisprudence
This award is an early CAS authority confirming the FIFA-compatibility of co-ownership agreements over player economic rights, establishing the foundational distinction between player registration and economic rights that underpins the entire third-party ownership debate. The panel's reliance on CAS 2004/A/635 (Espanyol v. Velez) signals an emerging line of jurisprudence on the subject. The award also clarifies that a club holding co-ownership rights owes its co-owner a duty of transparency and cooperation, and cannot passively accept a player's departure without triggering liability for the lost economic rights.
Decision: Appeal upheld in part; Galatasaray ordered to pay Internacional USD 400,000 (in addition to the USD 100,000 already paid), for a total compensation of USD 500,000; all other claims dismissed; arbitration costs shared equally; each party bears its own legal costs.
Cases cited in this award
CAS 2004/A/635, Espanyol v. Velez
Frequently asked questions about Internacional v. Galatasaray
Did CAS rule that co-ownership agreements over player economic rights are valid under FIFA rules in Internacional v. Galatasaray?
Yes. The panel held that Art. 1.1 of the Application Regulations governs only player registration and does not prohibit clubs from apportioning economic rights between themselves, provided the player is under an employment contract and expressly consents. The Co-ownership Agreement was therefore found to be enforceable.
Why was Galatasaray found in breach of the Co-ownership Agreement if the player terminated his own contract?
The panel found that by signing the Termination Agreement on 22 October 2003 and paying the player USD 600,000 without contesting his departure or invoking FIFA contractual stability rules, Galatasaray effectively consented to the termination and rendered it bilateral. The Co-ownership Agreement imposed a duty on Galatasaray not to release the player without Internacional's consent, which it breached.
How much did CAS award Internacional in the Internacional v. Galatasaray case and how was the figure calculated?
CAS awarded a total of USD 500,000, calculated as five annual loan fees of USD 100,000 each under Clause 8 of the Co-ownership Agreement for the remaining contract period until 31 May 2007. Since Galatasaray had already paid USD 100,000 pursuant to the FIFA Single Judge's decision, it was ordered to pay the remaining USD 400,000.
Why did CAS reject Internacional's claim for USD 3,500,000 in the Galatasaray co-ownership case?
The panel found that the Co-ownership Agreement did not oblige Galatasaray to buy or sell the player's economic rights; the USD 3,500,000 figure was the agreed purchase price for 40% of those rights, which Galatasaray had discretion whether to exercise. Internacional presented no evidence of third-party purchase offers, and the panel held that damages cannot be awarded on the basis of a mere hypothesis.
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