CAS Case Digest · Verified against the full award text

CAS 2018/A/5861 — Vinícius Santos Silva v. Al Shaab Football Club Co. LLC

"Vinícius Santos Silva" · CAS awarded a Brazilian player USD 627,230 after his UAE club terminated his employment agreement without just cause within 24 hours of signing.

What happened in Vinícius Santos Silva

Brazilian professional footballer Vinícius Santos Silva was loaned by Palmeiras to UAE club Al Shaab Football Club Co. LLC under a loan agreement and a separate employment agreement signed on 21 September 2015, covering the period to 30 June 2016. The employment agreement provided for total remuneration including a USD 100,000 signing fee, nine monthly payments of USD 44,444, and various benefits. Within 24 hours of signing, Al Shaab purported to cancel the arrangement on the basis that the player had not physically arrived in the UAE by 21 September 2015. The player was booked on a flight departing São Paulo that evening, arriving Dubai on 22 September 2015. The FIFA DRC found the club had terminated without just cause but awarded only USD 168,272 — one-third of its own USD 504,818 calculation — on the ground that the contract had never been 'executed.' The player appealed to CAS seeking USD 680,557 or alternatively USD 824,825.67. CAS held the employment agreement was validly executed upon signature, applied the contractual penalty clause (Art. 7.2) rather than Art. 17 FIFA RSTP, declined to reduce the clause as excessive, and awarded USD 627,230 plus 5% p.a. interest from 21 September 2015. The case matters because it clarifies the distinction between contract execution and commencement of services, and confirms that a contractual penalty clause displaces Art. 17 FIFA RSTP where the contract has been validly signed.

Procedural history of CAS 2018/A/5861

On 15 October 2015 Al Shaab filed a claim at the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (FIFA DRC) against the player and Palmeiras seeking USD 2,705,000 in damages. On 22 October 2015 the player filed a separate FIFA DRC claim against the club for USD 1,125,063 plus 5% interest. On 8 March 2018 the FIFA DRC rejected the club's claim, partially accepted the player's claim, and ordered the club to pay USD 168,272 plus 5% p.a. interest from 15 December 2015, reducing its own USD 504,818 figure by two-thirds on the basis the contract had never been 'executed.' The grounds were notified on 13 July 2018. On 2 August 2018 the player filed a Statement of Appeal with CAS (hard copy filed 6 August 2018). The club challenged admissibility, arguing the hard copy was filed late. CAS rejected that challenge. The club did not itself appeal the FIFA DRC decision. A hearing was held on 13 February 2019 in Lausanne. The award was rendered on 18 July 2019.

Key holdings in CAS 2018/A/5861

• A signed employment agreement is 'executed' and binding on the parties even if no services have yet been performed under it; the commencement of services is relevant only to the quantum of damages, not to the validity of the contract.
• Where a validly executed employment agreement contains a contractual penalty clause governing the consequences of termination, that clause displaces Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP as the applicable compensation methodology.
• Clause 7.2 of the employment agreement, entitling the player to the full payment and advantages stipulated in Article 3 until the end of the contract, was not excessive and required no reduction under Article 163(3) of the Swiss Code of Obligations in the circumstances of this case.
• The club failed to establish a 'serious violation' by the player or contributory negligence under Article 44(1) SCO, as the employment agreement contained no obligation for the player to be physically present in the UAE on 21 September 2015.
• Where a penalty clause entitles the player to the 'full payment' of salaries, no deduction for mitigation earnings is warranted, distinguishing the position under Article 17 FIFA RSTP.

How the CAS panel reasoned

The panel first addressed admissibility, holding that the statement of appeal filed by email on 2 August 2018 was timely and the hard-copy courier deadline ran to the first business day after the 21-day limit expired (6 August 2018, a Monday). On the merits, the panel drew a conceptual distinction between 'execution' of a contract (i.e., its conclusion by signature) and 'execution of services' under it, rejecting the FIFA DRC's reasoning that the contract had never been executed. The panel then held that because the contract was validly executed, clause 7.2 — a mutually agreed penalty clause — governed compensation, making resort to Article 17 FIFA RSTP unnecessary. The panel declined to find a 'serious violation' by the player, noting the employment agreement contained no express obligation to be physically present on 21 September 2015 and the club provided no documentary evidence to support its position. On proportionality under Article 163(3) SCO, the panel applied a restrictive approach, noting that clause 7.2 merely equated to the residual contract value (the ordinary starting point under Art. 17 FIFA RSTP) rather than an additional penalty, and that the player had made genuine arrangements to relocate. The panel excluded the car and flight-ticket claims as the player never incurred those expenses, but awarded the housing allowance. Mitigation was held irrelevant given the 'full payment' wording of clause 7.2.

Why Vinícius Santos Silva matters in CAS jurisprudence

This award establishes that a signed football employment agreement is 'executed' and binding from the moment of signature regardless of whether services have commenced, and that a contractual penalty clause providing for the full residual contract value displaces Article 17 FIFA RSTP as the compensation mechanism. It also clarifies the CAS hard-copy filing deadline under Article R31 of the CAS Code when an email filing is made before the last day of the appeal period, confirming the courier deadline runs to the first business day after the time limit expires.

Cases cited in this award

CAS 2008/A/1519-1520 CAS 2007/A/1298-1299-1300 CAS 2008/A/1545 CAS 2009/A/1880 CAS 2006/A/1082 CAS 2012/A/2875 CAS 2014/A/3707 CAS 2010/A/2202 CAS 2010/A/2002 CAS 2006/A/1180 TAS 2008/A/1491 CAS 2014/A/3684 CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402 CAS 2018/A/5857

Frequently asked questions about Vinícius Santos Silva

Why did CAS award more than FIFA in the Vinícius Santos Silva v Al Shaab case?

The FIFA DRC awarded only USD 168,272 — one-third of its own USD 504,818 calculation — on the basis that the employment agreement had never been 'executed.' CAS rejected that reasoning, holding the contract was validly executed upon signature on 21 September 2015, applied the contractual penalty clause (Art. 7.2) rather than Art. 17 FIFA RSTP, and awarded USD 627,230 plus 5% p.a. interest from 21 September 2015. The panel also declined to reduce the penalty clause as excessive under Art. 163(3) SCO.

Does a football employment contract need to have services performed before it is legally binding under CAS jurisprudence?

No. In this case the CAS panel drew a clear distinction between 'execution' of a contract (its conclusion by signature) and 'execution of services' under it. The panel held that the employment agreement signed on 21 September 2015 was validly executed and binding on both parties from that moment, even though the player never physically arrived in the UAE and no services were performed. The absence of services was relevant only to the quantum of damages, not to the contract's validity.

When does a contractual penalty clause in a player's employment agreement override Article 17 FIFA RSTP?

According to this award, Article 17(1) FIFA RSTP applies 'unless otherwise provided for in the contract.' Where the parties have agreed a penalty clause governing the consequences of termination — as in clause 7.2 of the employment agreement here — that clause takes precedence and there is no need to resort to Art. 17 FIFA RSTP. The panel also held that because clause 7.2 entitled the player to 'full payment,' no deduction for mitigation earnings was warranted, unlike under Art. 17.

What is the CAS deadline for filing a hard-copy statement of appeal when the email is sent before the last day of the appeal period?

Under Article R31 of the CAS Code, if a statement of appeal is transmitted by email before the deadline expires, the hard copy must be filed by courier by 'the first subsequent business day of the relevant time limit.' In this case the player emailed his statement of appeal on 2 August 2018, one day before the 21-day deadline expired on 3 August 2018 (a Friday). The panel held the hard-copy courier deadline was therefore Monday 6 August 2018, the first business day after the time limit expired, and the appeal was admissible.

Topics: Art. 17 RSTP & contract termination at CAS

Source: official award. This digest was generated by LexXi from the full award text and machine-verified against it — every figure, article and citation above appears in the source. It is an editorial summary, not legal advice. See how ElevenLex verification works.