CAS Case Digest · Verified against the full award text

CAS 2025/A/11173 — Tullio Tinti v. FIFA

"Tinti" · CAS set aside FIFA General Secretariat's provisional suspension of an agent's license because the FIFA GS lacked competence to impose what was effectively a definitive suspension.

What happened in Tinti

Tullio Tinti, an Italian football agent licensed since 1992, accepted a 36-month suspension and EUR 80,000 fine from the FIGC in 2012 pursuant to a settlement under Article 23 of the Italian Code of Sports Justice. He later resumed work and, in September 2023, obtained FIFA license No. 202309-3517 under the newly enacted FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR). In October 2024, FIFA queried his eligibility under Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR, which bars anyone suspended for two years or more by a sports governing body for ethics/professional-conduct violations. On 16 January 2025, the FIFA General Secretariat (FIFA GS) provisionally suspended his license, citing the 2012 FIGC sanction. Tinti appealed to CAS. The panel focused on a threshold competence question: whether the FIFA GS had authority to render what was, in practice, a definitive suspension. Relying on the earlier Beckett Case (CAS 2024/A/10918), the panel held that Articles 5, 17, and 21 FFAR assign final determinations to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, not the FIFA GS. Because Article 21 FFAR was suspended with no clear reinstatement date, the 'provisional' suspension was indefinite in duration and therefore de facto definitive. The FIFA GS had no competence to impose such a measure. The panel also flagged unresolved interpretive questions — notably whether a settlement-based sanction falls within Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR — and proportionality concerns. The appeal was upheld and the license reinstated.

Procedural history of CAS 2025/A/11173

In 2012, the FIGC National Disciplinary Committee sanctioned Tinti with a 36-month license suspension and a EUR 80,000 fine following a settlement under Article 23 of the Italian Code of Sports Justice. He resumed activity in 2015. On 2 September 2023, FIFA issued him license No. 202309-3517 under the FFAR. On 25 October 2023, the FIGC alerted FIFA to the 2012 sanction. On 14 October 2024, FIFA's Agent Department requested documentation. On 16 January 2025, the FIFA General Secretariat issued the Appealed Decision provisionally suspending the license under Article 17(3)(a) FFAR, declaring it a final decision appealable to CAS under Article 50 of the FIFA Statutes. Tinti filed his Statement of Appeal on 5 February 2025. A request for a stay was dismissed by the panel on 30 May 2025. A hearing was held on 4 September 2025 in Lausanne. The panel issued its award on 22 October 2025.

Key holdings in CAS 2025/A/11173

• The FIFA General Secretariat lacked competence to determine that the Agent failed to meet eligibility requirements and to impose what constituted a de facto definitive suspension of his license.
• A provisional suspension that is indefinite in duration — because the body competent to render a final decision (the FIFA Disciplinary Committee) has no clear reinstatement date — assumes the nature of a definitive measure and cannot properly be characterised as provisional.
• The FIFA GS's investigative competence under Article 17 FFAR is ordinarily intended for situations arising after the issuance of a license; facts predating issuance require a more thorough investigative procedure, including consideration of why the license was initially granted.
• Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR, unlike Article 5(1)(a)(ii) FFAR, contains no express reference to 'settlements,' raising a systematic-interpretation argument that sanctions imposed pursuant to a settlement may not be captured by that provision — an issue the FIFA GS failed to address.
• The CAS panel declined to exercise its de novo powers to substitute itself for the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, as the Agent had not requested such substitution and insufficient elements were before the panel to do so.

How the CAS panel reasoned

The panel identified the threshold question as whether the FIFA GS possessed competence to render the Appealed Decision, following the approach in the Beckett Case (CAS 2024/A/10918). Reading Articles 5, 17, and 21 FFAR together, the panel mapped a four-step process: investigation, adversarial phase, provisional suspension, and referral to the FIFA DC for a final decision. The FIFA GS completed steps one through three but could not take step four because Article 21 FFAR was suspended. The panel rejected FIFA's argument that the suspension remained 'provisional' because Article 21 might eventually be reinstated, reasoning that the absence of any clarity or foreseeability as to reinstatement rendered the suspension indefinite and therefore de facto definitive. The panel further found the FIFA GS's investigation insufficiently thorough for a measure of such severity: it failed to explain why no concerns were raised when the license was granted in 2023 (when both FIFA and the FIGC confirmed eligibility), failed to address whether a settlement-based sanction falls within Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR (which, unlike Article 5(1)(a)(ii), does not mention settlements), and failed to weigh proportionality factors including the 13-year gap since the sanction and the Agent's subsequent criminal acquittal. The panel declined to substitute itself for the FIFA DC, citing the Agent's prayers for relief and the absence of sufficient evidence.

Why Tinti matters in CAS jurisprudence

Tinti establishes that the FIFA General Secretariat's competence under Articles 5 and 17 FFAR is limited to investigation and provisional notification: it cannot render a de facto definitive suspension when the FIFA Disciplinary Committee's jurisdiction is suspended under Article 21 FFAR with no clear reinstatement date. Following the Beckett Case (CAS 2024/A/10918), the award reinforces that a 'provisional' measure becomes de facto definitive — and therefore ultra vires for the FIFA GS — when no competent body exists to replace it with a final decision. The award also flags an unresolved textual question: whether settlement-based sanctions fall within Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR, given that only Article 5(1)(a)(ii) expressly mentions settlements.

Cases cited in this award

CAS 2024/A/10918 CAS 2014/A/3776 CAS 2011/O/2422 CAS 2011/A/2658 CAS 2018/A/5785 CAS 2023/O/9370

Frequently asked questions about Tinti

Why did CAS set aside the FIFA suspension of Tullio Tinti's agent license?

The panel held that the FIFA General Secretariat lacked competence to impose what was effectively a definitive suspension. Under Articles 5, 17, and 21 FFAR, final determinations on eligibility must be made by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, but Article 21 FFAR was suspended with no clear reinstatement date. Because no body could replace the provisional suspension with a final decision, the suspension was de facto permanent and therefore beyond the FIFA GS's authority.

Does a settlement-based FIGC suspension trigger the Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR lifetime ban?

The Tinti panel expressly left this question open. It noted that Article 5(1)(a)(ii) FFAR explicitly covers 'settlements,' whereas Article 5(1)(a)(iii) — the provision relied upon by FIFA — contains no such reference. The panel found that a systematic interpretation could support the conclusion that sanctions imposed pursuant to a settlement are not captured by Article 5(1)(a)(iii), and criticised the FIFA GS for failing to address this interpretive issue in the Appealed Decision.

Can the FIFA General Secretariat re-examine eligibility based on facts that predate the issuance of a FIFA agent license?

The Tinti panel held that such a re-examination requires a more thorough investigative procedure than a standard ongoing-compliance review. The panel stressed that the FIFA GS must also account for why the license was initially granted — in this case, both FIFA and the FIGC had confirmed Tinti's eligibility in September 2023 — and must address any grounds for revocation such as error or omission. The FIFA GS's investigation was found insufficiently diligent for a measure as severe as indefinite suspension.

What is the significance of the Tinti case for agents suspended under national federation rules before the FFAR came into force?

Tinti confirms that the FIFA GS cannot, acting alone, impose a de facto permanent ban on an agent whose pre-FFAR national suspension would trigger Article 5(1)(a)(iii) FFAR. The panel flagged unresolved questions about proportionality (Tinti had served his 36-month ban by 2015 and incurred no further sanctions), the relevance of a subsequent criminal acquittal, and whether settlement-based sanctions fall within the provision at all. These issues must be resolved by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee once Article 21 FFAR is reinstated.

Topics: Art. 17 RSTP & contract termination at CAS

Source: official award. This digest was generated by LexXi from the full award text and machine-verified against it — every figure, article and citation above appears in the source. It is an editorial summary, not legal advice. See how ElevenLex verification works.