CAS Case Digest · Verified against the full award text

CAS 2025/A/11594 — Sport Clube União Torreense Futebol, SAD v. Pedro Henrique Venaque Barbosa

"União Torreense v. Barbosa" · CAS upheld FIFA DRC ruling that a Portuguese club terminated a Brazilian player's contract without just cause after he fell seriously ill.

What happened in União Torreense v. Barbosa

Pedro Henrique Venaque Barbosa, a Brazilian professional footballer, signed a two-year employment contract with Portuguese club Sport Clube União Torreense Futebol, SAD on 9 July 2024. Within days of the contract commencing, the Player was hospitalised in Lisbon with nephrotic syndrome and acute kidney injury, requiring dialysis and corticosteroid treatment. After discharge, he travelled to Brazil for specialist nephrology care and was subsequently re-hospitalised there. The Club stopped paying his remuneration almost immediately after his illness became known, deducting wages on the basis of alleged unjustified absences and lack of formal medical certificates. On 28 October 2024, the Club terminated the Contract, citing supervening, absolute and definitive impossibility of performance. The Player had already issued a notice of default on 18 October 2024 claiming EUR 11,321.91 in unpaid remuneration. The FIFA DRC found the Club terminated without just cause and ordered it to pay EUR 15,067.92 in outstanding remuneration and EUR 98,800 in compensation. The Club appealed to CAS. The Sole Arbitrator dismissed the appeal, confirming that a player's illness cannot constitute just cause for termination, that the Club's prior material breach of its payment obligation precluded it from invoking just cause, and that the Player's decision to seek treatment in Brazil was a legitimate exercise of personal rights. The case reinforces the principle that clubs bear the financial risk when a player becomes ill after contract signature.

Procedural history of CAS 2025/A/11594

On 5 December 2024, the Player filed a Statement of Claim before the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (FIFA DRC). On 15 May 2025, the FIFA DRC issued its decision, finding that the Club terminated the Contract without just cause and ordering the Club to pay EUR 15,067.92 net as outstanding remuneration (with 5% interest p.a. on various tranches from August–October 2024) and EUR 98,800 net as compensation for breach of contract (with 5% interest p.a. from 28 October 2024). The DRC rejected the Club's counterclaim. The grounds were notified on 24 June 2025. On 14 July 2025, the Club filed a Statement of Appeal at CAS pursuant to Articles R47 and R48 of the CAS Code. The Appeal Brief was filed on 14 August 2025. The Respondent's Answer was filed on 28 November 2025. A virtual hearing was held on 8 April 2026. The CAS award was rendered on 7 August 2026, dismissing the appeal and confirming the FIFA DRC decision in its entirety.

Key holdings in CAS 2025/A/11594

• A player's inability to provide services due to illness or injury is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute just cause for a club to terminate an employment contract.
• A club's prior and ongoing material breach of its obligation to pay remuneration precludes it from relying on just cause for termination.
• A player's decision to seek medical treatment abroad falls within the legitimate exercise of personal rights and cannot be treated as a breach of contractual obligations or a basis for withholding remuneration.
• Where the club is fully informed of a player's medical condition through its own medical staff, requiring formal medical certificates is excessively formalistic and cannot justify non-payment.
• In CAS appeal proceedings against FIFA body decisions, FIFA regulations apply primarily and any contractual choice of national law (here Portuguese law) operates only subsidiarily and cannot displace the primacy of the applicable sporting regulations under Article R58 of the CAS Code.

How the CAS panel reasoned

The Sole Arbitrator first resolved the applicable law question, holding that Article R58 of the CAS Code mandates primary application of FIFA regulations (particularly the RSTP) over the parties' contractual choice of Portuguese law, which may only serve as interpretive or supplementary guidance. On the merits, the Sole Arbitrator found that the Player's illness was known to the Club from mid-July 2024 through its own medical staff, including Dr. Meneses, who confirmed awareness of the Player's serious condition and lack of any prospect of near-term return. The Club's argument that absences were unjustified due to absence of formal medical certificates was rejected as excessively formalistic given the Club's actual knowledge. The Player's travel to Brazil was characterised as a legitimate exercise of personal autonomy over medical treatment, not a contractual breach. Critically, the Sole Arbitrator applied a chronological analysis: the Club had already been in material breach of its payment obligation for several months before it purported to terminate. This prior breach precluded the Club from invoking just cause. The Club's counterclaim for compensation and moral damages was rejected. The Sole Arbitrator also noted the Club failed to submit a subsidiary position on quantum, so the FIFA DRC figures were confirmed without further analysis.

Why União Torreense v. Barbosa matters in CAS jurisprudence

This award consolidates the well-established CAS principle that player illness cannot constitute just cause for club-initiated contract termination, and adds an important chronological dimension: a club already in material breach of its payment obligation cannot subsequently invoke just cause. It also provides a clear restatement of the applicable law hierarchy in CAS appeals against FIFA decisions, confirming that contractual choices of national law cannot displace the primacy of FIFA regulations under Article R58 of the CAS Code.

Cases cited in this award

CAS 2012/A/2698 CAS 2022/A/9279 CAS 2013/A/3436 CAS 2009/A/1956 CAS 2023/A/10168 CAS 2009/A/1758 CAS 2018/A/5771 CAS 2014/A/3626 CAS 2023/A/9434

Frequently asked questions about União Torreense v. Barbosa

Can a football club terminate a player's contract because the player is too ill to play?

No. The Sole Arbitrator in União Torreense v. Barbosa confirmed the long-established CAS principle, reaffirmed in CAS 2023/A/9434, that a player's inability to provide services due to illness or injury is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute just cause for termination. The Club's argument that the Player's nephrotic syndrome and kidney failure amounted to a supervening, absolute and definitive impossibility of performance was rejected.

What happens if a club stops paying a sick player and then tries to terminate the contract for just cause?

In União Torreense v. Barbosa, the Sole Arbitrator held that the Club's prior and ongoing material breach of its payment obligation — ceasing to pay the Player almost immediately after his illness became known in mid-July 2024 — precluded it from relying on just cause for termination. The chronological sequence was decisive: a party in material breach cannot invoke just cause against the other party.

Can a club withhold a player's salary because the player travelled abroad for medical treatment without formal authorisation?

No. The Sole Arbitrator found that the Player's decision to travel to Brazil to seek specialist nephrology treatment was a legitimate exercise of his personal rights and physical autonomy, which the Club could not restrict. Because the Club was already fully informed of the Player's serious medical condition through its own medical staff, requiring formal medical certificates was deemed excessively formalistic and could not justify withholding remuneration.

Does a contractual choice of Portuguese law override FIFA regulations in a CAS appeal?

No. Although Clause 11 of the Contract designated Portuguese law as the primary governing law with the RSTP applying subsidiarily, the Sole Arbitrator held that in CAS appeal proceedings against FIFA body decisions, Article R58 of the CAS Code mandates primary application of FIFA regulations. Portuguese law could only be considered subsidiarily and as interpretive guidance, and could not displace the primacy of the RSTP. The Appellant's reliance on CAS 2023/A/10168 and CAS 2009/A/1758 was rejected as those cases confirmed the same hierarchy.

Topics: Art. 17 RSTP & contract termination at CAS

Source: official award. This digest was generated by LexXi from the full award text and machine-verified against it — every figure, article and citation above appears in the source. It is an editorial summary, not legal advice. See how ElevenLex verification works.